We derive axiomatically the probability function that should be used to make decisions given any form of underlying uncertainty.
1.
Introduction.
Beliefs.
Many new models have been proposed to quantify uncertainty. But usually they don't explain how decisions must be derived. In probability theory, the expected utility model is well established and strongly justified. We show that such expected utility model can be derived in the other models proposed to quantify someone's belief. The justification is based on special bets and some coherence requirements that lead to the derivation of the so-called generalized insufficient reason principle. In Smets (1988b Smets ( , 1988c Smets ( , 1989 we em phasize the existence of two levels where beliefs manifest themselves: the credal level where beliefs are entertained and the pignistic level where beliefs are used to take decisions (pignus = a bet in Latin, Smith
1961).
Uncertainty induces beliefs, i.e. graded dispositions that guide our behaviour. Translated within a normative approach, this leads usually to the construction of a model to quantify beliefs that is linked directly to "rational" agent behaviour within betting and decision contexts (DeGroot 1970 have convincingly showed that if decisions mu st be "coherent", our belief over the various outcomes must be quantified by a probability function. This result is accepted here. Hence at the pinistic level beliefs are quantified by probability functions. But probability functions are used to quantify our belief on l y when a decision is really involved.
That beliefs are necessary ingredients for our decisions does not mean that beliefs cannot be entertained without any revealing behaviour manifestations (Smith and Jones, p.l47).
The probability function that quantifies our belief at the pignistic level reflects an underlying credal state. At the credal level, quantified beliefs can be represented by other models like the transferable belief model (Smets 1988a (Smets , 1989a , the possibility theory model (Dubois and Prade 1988) , the upper and lower probabilities models Good (1950) , convex sets of probability functions (Kyburg 1987b) , Dempster-Shafer's models (Shafer 1976), etc ... The difference between these models are studied in detail in Smets ( 1989a Smets ( , 1989b All beliefs entertained by an agent are defined relative to a given doxastic cor pus that consists of all pieces of information in the agent' � possession. Our approach is normative: the agent is an ideal rational subject and the doxastic corpus is deductively closed.
The function that quantifies our belief at the credal level will be called here a credibility function, denoted Cr. We introduce such name as a generic for the familly of functions proposed to quantify beliefs like the probability functions, the belief functions, the lower probabilities functions, the necessity functions and their dual.
Our derivation of the pignistic probability function fits with any credibility function. It is not restricted to any of the above mentioned functions. It fits with Dempster-Shafer model, but is not restricted to it. Hence the "credibility" qualification used to enhance the generality of our results.
Beliefs being the governing principles of our decisions, the (pignistic) probability functions observed at the pignistic level must be derived from the credibility functions present at the credal level. Some forms of coherence must be satisfied by this transformation. These coherence requirements lead to the derivation of an unique transformation. This paper presents these requirements and the derived transformation that turns out to be an application of the generalized insufficient reason principle (Dubois and Prade 1982 , Williams 1982 , Smets 1988a 1.2. The propositional space.
Let n be a non empty finite set called the frame of discernment equipped with a Boolean algebra 9l of some of its subsets. 2. The credibility functi on.
Suppose an agent, with his/her doxastic corpus, entertains beliefs over a frame n, i.e.
he/she assigns degrees of belief to the elements of 9l, an algebra defined on n. It is postulated that degrees of belief are quantified by a point-valued "credibility" function Cr which maps � into a closed interval of the real line, is monotonic for inclusion, reaches its lower limit for On and its upper limit for ln if
In is equivalent to a tautology 't. (That ln might be different from a tautology reflects the distinction between the open-world and the closed-world assumptions as explained in Smets (1988a).
Axiom AI: Let a propositional space (Q, 9l). Given a credibility space tJ, if ln:-r, then Cr(ln) ='I' Doxastically equivalent propositions should always receive equal credibilities (Kyburg, 1987a) Axiom A6: equi-credibi1ity of doxastically equivalent propositions.
Suppose two credibility spaces (Qi, 9tj, Cq), i=1,2. If Ate9tt. A2e9t2 and At:A2, then Cq(At) = Cr2(A2).
Suppose two credibility spaces (Q, 9tj, Crj), i= 1 ,2, defined on the same space n. Axiom A6 implies that those propositions that belong to both algebras will always receive the same credibility as they are logically equivalent. Hence the credibility given to a proposition does not depend on the structure of the algebra to which the proposition belongs.
Axiom A6 permits to prove the following anonymity theorem.
Theorem 1: Let G be a permutation function defined on n. For A en, let G(A) = {G(x): xeA}. Let a credibility space (Q, 9t, Cr). Let Cr' be the credibility function defined on 9t' = {G(A): Ae9t}. Then, by axiom A6, "VAeCft., Cr'(G(A)) = Cr(A)
3. a-combined credibility spaces.
We are going to show that the set of credibility functions defined on a propositional space (Q, 9t) is a convex set.
To show this we introduce a combined bet schema. Suppose two propositional spaces ( Qi , 9ti) i=1,2, where the atoms of 9tj are {Ait, A12 • ... , Ain}-Let N = {1, 2 ... n}. Such a pair of propositional spaces (and the corresponding credibility spaces) are said combinable.
Let Pi , i=l,2 be two combinable credibility spaces. Suppose a random generator that generates event R with P(R=r)=a and P(R=s )= 1-a. Define the a-combined credibility space p 12 = (!212. 9t 1 2 , Cr12) with atoms {At2j: j = 1, 2 ... n}. 
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Figure 1: Two combinable credibility spaces with atoms Ati and A2i. i=l, ... n, and the a combined credibility space with atoms A t2i · Atom At2 i is true whenever (R=r and Ati is true) or (R=s and A21 is true) where P(R=r)=a and P(R""s):= 1-a.
We will show in §4 that under natural requirements, one has:
Suppose two combinable credibility spaces p j, i= 1 ,2, and their associated a-combined credibility space .f012· The following axioms are postulated for credibility function Cr12.
Axiom Cl:pointwise compositionality.
There exists a function F:
Axiom C2: continuity.
F(x,y) is continuous in (x,y)e [c)>, '1'] 2
Axiom C3: strict monotony.
F(x,y) is strictly monotonic for x, ye [cp, 'l'l Axiom C4: idempotency. Continuity is classically accepted , it could be weakened but without real profit.
Strict monotony is postulated as we consider that Cr12 should be sensitive to both of its components. The credibi�it � . of one proposition in 9tt should no,t � � h1b1ted even locally the impact of our credtbihty on another proposition in 9t2 (and vice versa).
Finally idempotency reflects the idea that if � 1 and � 2 happen to be the same credibility spaces, then Cq2 = Crt:: Cr 2 .
In theorem 2, we show that F satisfies the bisynunetry equation
whose solution is detailed in Aczel ( 1966, pg. 
287)
Figure 1: creation in the proof of theorem 2 of9tt2 34 by combining 9tt2 with 9t34, or 9t1 3 with 9tz4·
Theorem 2: Given two combinable credibility spaces pt. i= 1 ,2, and their associated a-combined credibility space � 1 2 .
given axioms Cl to C4, then the F function in axiom Cl satisfies: Consider also the join a-combined credibility space � (1 2)(34 ) = ( 0(12)(34)• 9t(t2)(34)• Cr(t2)(34) ) b � i ld from � 12 and p 34· Let the result from success1ve uses of the R-device be stochastically independent.
Let Rt. R2 and R3 be the three independent random variables generated by the R-device that will be used respectively to select between tJ 12 and P 34, between� 1 and �2. between P3 and P4· Let RjE {r i , sj} with P(Rj=r i ) = a for i= l , 2 , 3. Proposition A(t2)(34)j in 9t (1 2 and A3j ) or (s 1 and s3 and A4j).
Consider then the join a-combined credibility space P (l3)(24 ) build from Pl3 and P24· Proposition A(l3)(24 ) j. in 9t(l3)(24 ) is true if (q and f2 and Atj ) or (q and 5 2 and A3j) or (st and £3 and A2j) or (SI and s3 andA4 j).
Hence to decide that propositions A(l2)(34)j and A(l3)(24)j are true, one check the propositions within 9tj where the index i is selected by a random process, each value having the same chance to be selected in the two j oin ll-combined credibility spaces P(12) (34) and P ( 13}(24 ) : P(i=l) = ll 2 , P(i=2) = P (i = 3) = ll(l-n) and P(i= 4 ) = {l-a} 2
This identity means that the credibility functions
Cr (t2)(34) and Cr (l3)(24) are identical, hence the Suppose we have a credibility space p = (.Q, � . Cr ) . When a decision must be taken that depends on the proposition in � that will be true, one must construct a pignistic probability function on 9t in order to take the optimal decision that maximizes the expected utility. We assume, as explained in the introduction, that the pignistic probability function defined on 9t is a function of the credibility function Cr. Hence one must transform Cr into a probability function P. This transformation is called hereafter the r9\ transformation where the 9t index mentions the Boolean algebra on which Cr and P are defined: so P = r9t(Cr). It is also postulated that the transformation depends only on the cardinality of 9t, not on the nature of its atoms.
Axiom Pl : Let a credibility space p = (Q, 9\, Cr) and P = r9t(Cr). For any atom (l) of 9\, P((l)) = g((l), {Cr(A): Ae9t})
Axiom Pl formalizes the idea that our beliefs guide our behaviours. Evaluation of P for non atoms of 9t is obtained by adding the appropriate probabilities. where I�N. Then, VI�N. Pt2CA121 ) = n.P1(Au) + (l-n).P2(A2r)
Axiom P2 formalizes in the present context the well-known property: P(X) = P(XIA).P(A) + P(XIA).P(A) as the Pi(Au) are the conditional probabilities P 12 of A121 in context 9\ i and a is the probability of the context 9\ 1· e.g. P1 (An) = P t2(ArzriR=r).
Axiom P2 implies that the function f in theorem 2 is such that f(x) = x.
Indeed suppose Crj are probability functions P i, then Crt2 is also a probability function P 1 2 with:
Crt 2(At2I) = PI2(At2I) = Pt2(A12IIR=r) a + Ptz(At2IIR=s) ( 1 -n)
As Pt2(AI2IIR=r) = Pt(Ali) and P I2(At2IIR=s) = Pz(A2I), ( 1 ) becomes: (A2I) i.e. f(af" l (x) + (1-a)f" l (y)) =ax+ (l-n) y what implies that r-l(x)"' x and a= a.
Therefore (1) becomes:
The anonymity property of theorem I is generalized to pignistic probabilities.
Axiom P3: anonymity : Let G be a permutation function defined on Q. For A� n, let G(A) = {G(x): XE A}. Let a credibility space (Q, 9\, Cr) and P = rgr. Let the credibility space (.Q, 9t', Cr') where 9t' = {G(A): AE9t}. Let P' = rgr·. Then VAE9t, P'(G(A)) = P(A).
Let a credibility space {P = (Q, 9t, Cr) and P = r 9\ (Cr). As far as P is a probability function, it ·must satisfy the following obvious properties: If Cr happens to be a probability function P defined on 9\, then r9\(P) = P.
Axiom Q 1 tells that if 9t is rich enough so that ln is equivalent to a tautology, then the probabilities given to the atoms of 9t add to one.
Axiom Q2 tells that the credibility given to a proposition is not changed when one adds any impossible proposition to it.
Axioms Q3 recognizes that if someone's credibility is already described by a probability function, then the pignistic probabilities and the credibilities are equal.
Theorem 3 shows that the g function of axiom PI is a linear function of its arguments Cr(A): Ae9t. Figure 3 illustrates the origin of this linearity. There are two ways by which P12 can be constructed: either build each P i and combine them or combine both Cri into Cr12 and transform the last into P 12 · Both approaches must give the same answer.
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Ct 1 Axioms Q1 to Q3 permit then to derive all the coefficients of (3).
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Theorem 3. Given a credibility space (Q, 9\, Cr) and P = r9\(Cr). Given (2), axioms Pl and P2, then there exists a and b such that for any atom co of 9\,
Proof.Let P(R=r) =ex, J3 = l-ex, XI= Cq(All) and YI = Cr:z(Azi). ( 2 ) becomes: VI�N Cq2(AI 2I) = a.xJ + j3.y1 Replacing P in axiom P2, one has: (as co is fixed, it is dropped from the notation) g(a.xJ+J3.yh a.x2+13·Y2····> s a.g(xt. x2 ... ) + j3.g(YJ, Y2···>
The proof is based on the transformation of this relation into a Pexider equation (Aczel, 1966, p. 141) and then a Cauchy equation (Aczel, 1966, p. 214) .
Hence g is linear in its components and the coefficients may depend only on I and co. QED
As a consequence of the anonymity axiom P3 and theorem 1, it can easily be shown that the coefficients a and bi n (3) depend only on the number of atoms in A and (l)('lA. The transformation r 9\ permits the construction of a probability function (called the pignistic probability function) at the pignistic level given any credibility function at the credal level.
Co-credibility function.
Given a credibility function Cr on a propositional space (.Q, 9\), define the co credibility function CoCr as CoCr(A)"" Cr(ln)-Cr( A) 'v'A�Q Replacing Cr by its dual CoCr in theorem 3 leads to the same probability function P. For any pair (Cr, CoCr) r 9\ (Cr) = rst(CoCr) Using Cr or its dual CoCr is equivalent.
The Moebius trans forma tions of
Cr.
For any credibility space g:>, there are two Moebius transforms v and w of the credibility function defined on 9t such that ';f Ae 9t (with all summations taken on those B that are propositions of9t):
BnA.e0 The transformation between Cr, v and w are one to one. In belief functions theory, the v's are the basic belief masses if Cr is a belief function, and the w's are the basic belief masses if Cr is a plausibility function.
Given the v and w functions, one has:
Should Cr be respectively a belief, necessity, lower probability or probability function then CoCr would be a plausibility, possibility, upper probabil ity or probability function, and vice versa.
Replacing Cr by v or w, (4) becomes: 7. Conclusions.
The generalized insufficient reason principle had already been proposed intuitively as a potential solution to derive a probability function from a belief function (Dubois and Prade 1982 , Williams 1982 , Smets 1988a but never justified. We provide an axiomatic justification of this principle based on coherence between combined bets and applicabfe for any measure of belief whose major property is to be monotonic for set inclusion.
Hence any model for quantified beliefs can be endowed with the needed procedure to transform someone's beliefs entertained at the credallevel into a pignistic probability that can be used at the pignistic level when decisions must be taken. This transformation and its justification should answer to the classical criticism of the Dempster-Shafer model and other models based on belief functions, on possibility functions, on upper and lower probabilities functions, etc ... Decisions are then based on expected utility theory, using the pignistic probability function to compute the needed expectations.
The link of this model with practical decision problems is straighforward. Given a credibility function Cr that quantifies your degree of belief, if you must make a decision, transform Cr into the pignistic probability function by applying the generalized insufficient reason principle and then use this probability function to select the optimal decision. The whole classical decision theory (the expected utility theory) applies directly Smets, 1988b Smets, , 1988c Smets, , 1989a .
